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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE
RECORD
DEMONSTRATES
THE
TRIAL
COURT
ERRONEOUSLY UTLIZED AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD IN THE
COURSE OF DENYING MR. KUCHARSKI'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW THE NO-CONTEST PLEA,

The State argues that the Mr. Kucharski's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea was properly denied.
6-18.

See Brief of Appellee, pp.

Based on the record, this argument is without merit for the

reasons set forth below.
Generally speaking, an appellate court reviews the trial
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion.

State

v.

Benvenuto,

1999 UT 60, %10,

983 P.2d 556.

However, when, as in the instant case, the trial court's denial
involves an interpretation of a statute or binding case law, the
appellate court is presented with a question of law, which it then
reviews for correctness.

See State

v. Merrill,

2005 UT 34, 1|l2,

114 P.3d 585 (quoting State v. Ostler,

2001 UT 68, %5, 31 P.3d

528) (statutory interpretation) ; Rushton

v. Salt Lake

UT 36, Hl7, 977 P.2d 1201
Leyva,

951

P.2d

738,

County,

1999

(statutory interpretation); State v.

741

(Utah

1997)

interpretation); and Stevenson v. Goodson,

(binding

case

law

924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah

1996) (binding case law interpretation).
M

[T] he

substantive

goal

of

rule

11

is

to

ensure

that

defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic

1

consequences of their decision to plead guilty."

State

v.

Visser,

2000 UT 88, ^11, 22 P.3d 1242. Nevertheless, u[t]he trial court's
compliance with Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility the
court abused its discretion in refusing the defendant's motion [to
withdraw the guilty plea] if his plea was in fact involuntary."
State v.
denied,

Thorup,
853 P.2d

841 P. 2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert.
897

(Utah 1993).

Moreover,

"x for a plea of

guilty to be valid it must appear that the accused had a clear
understanding of the charge and without undue influence, coercion,
or improper

inducement

(quoting State v. Forsyth,

voluntarily

entered

such plea.'"

Id.

560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977)).

In this case, Mr. Kucharski filed a Motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, arguing that he did not voluntarily enter the guilty
plea

due

to

appointed

trial

counsel's

failure

to

subpoena

witnesses in preparation for trial (R. 97-101).

During a hearing

on

appointed

the Motion,

counsel

had

Mr.

failed

Kucharski
to

testified

subpoena

that

witnesses

he

had

trial

previously

provided to counsel, resulting in him having no other option but
to plead guilty (R. 208:18-19).
The State, in its Brief, argues the following:
At the very least, however, the record
negates
defendant's
claim
that
there
was
"unrefutted testimony" that trial counsel had
failed to talk to his udefense witnesses prior to
the scheduled trial." Aplt. Br. 14. Instead, the
2

record shows that defense counsel contacted the
potential witnesses, but then chose not to
subpoena them only after learning that they would
not support defendant's story.
Defendant's
mvoluntanness claim is therefore based on a
false factual predicate. It should be rejected on
this basis alone.
I

I
Brief of Appellee, p. 9.

This is incorrect.

Contrary to the

I

State's assertion, appointed trial counsel spoke with only two or
three of the witnesses provided to him by Mr. Kucharski prior to

I
tnal

(R. 208:31:10-20; R. 208:32:3-6).

In fact, when asked the

reason that he did not subpoena any of the witnesses, appointed
trial counsel responded that he did not subpoena any witnesses due
to Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor."
(R. 208:33:1-8) .
Immediately after the hearing, the trial court denied the
Motion, concluding that an objective standard is to be exclusively
utilized in the course of considering a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea

(R. 208:57-58).

In the course of its ruling, the

trial court stated:
Unless there is something from the Utah Supreme
Court or the U.S. Supreme Court or the Utah Court
of Appeals that says that a judge who asks these
questions, goes through what the judge is supposed
to go trough [sic] with this form of plea
affidavit that we have, and gets statements from
the defendant, I believe that there's no -- no
standard that says that I have to then go back
secondhand and say if somebody later after the
3

fact says, judge what I told you was a lie and I
really didn't mean it, that it can't be -- I can't
see how it can be a subjective standard because if
it is a subjective standard, then every person
that we have asked and gone through, you know,
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of defendants
over the last number of years, then every one of
them can come back and say, well, judge, despite
that, that wasn't true.
(R. 208:57-58) .
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (a) , "A plea of
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
State

v.

Thurman,

In

911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court

held that the disputed guilty plea was not knowing because the
defendant did not understand the elements of the crime in spite of
his unequivocal statements to the contrary.

Id.

at

375.

In the

course of its holding, the Court emphasized defendant's repeated
statements that he did not have the requisite

intent and his
Id.;

specific refusal to admit to certain consequences.
State

v. Martinez,

2001 UT 12, fl8, 26 P.3d

203

see

also

(relying on

defendant's declarations that he "didn't want to go through a
trial because [he] didn't want to put [the victim's mother] . . .
through the emotion and go through the hurt" m

the course of

affirming trial court's denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea).
Further, in State
cert, denied,

v. Thorup,

841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), this Court, in the course
4

of affirming the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
recited the following portion of the trial court's ruling:
As to the assertion that
[defendant's]
attorney used undue influence, the evidence
presented shows nothing more than an attorney
counseling the defendant and his family with
regard to what he considers to be the best
approach, knowing
all
of
the
facts
from
the
defendant's
point
of
view
and
giving
his
considered judgment and advice to the defendant
and his family that the plea barg[a]in was in the
defendant's best interest . . . .
The court could
not find from evidence presented on this question
that [defendant's attorney] in iny way abandoned
his representation for economic reasons or because
of pressures from the family to change his advice
and reject the plea bargain and enter a plea of
not guilty.
Id.

at 748 (emphasis added).
The State concedes that the test for reviewing a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea "is subjective, not objective,"
of Appellee, p. 16 (citing State v. Humphrey,
U1fl2-13, 79 P.3d 960).

See Brief

2003 UT App 333,

Notwithstanding the trial court's explicit

pronouncement to the contrary, the State argues the trial court
"correctly analyzed defendant's motion on a subjective basis."
See Brief of Appellee, p. 16.

The record demonstrates otherwise.

The trial court's failure to address appointed trial counsel's
failure to subpoena witnesses for trial, demonstrates that the
trial court utilized a purely objective standard in ruling on Mr.
Kucharski's

Motion

to withdraw

5

his plea

of

no

contest.

By

utilizing a purely objective standard in the course of its ruling,
the

trial

binding

court

case

law

misinterpreted
and

thereby

the

applicable

failed

to

statutory

consider

and

unrefutted

testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk with all the
potential witnesses and thereby subpoena defense witnesses prior
to

the

scheduled

trial.

Only on

the eve of

trial

did Mr.

Kucharski learn that none of his requested witnesses had been
subpoenaed for trial.

Consequently, Mr. Kucharski did not enter

his no-contest plea of his own free will and choice.

Rather, the

plea was entered involuntarily under the duress of appointed trial
counsel's failure to investigate and subpoena requested defense
witnesses.

II.

AS CONCEDED BY THE STATE, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE MR, KUCHARSKI'S
OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) provides m

relevant part:

Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved
by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of
the sentencing judge, and the ]udge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department.
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot
be resolved, the court shall make a determination
of relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see
App 206, ^26, 94 P. 3d 295.

also

State

v. Maroney,

2004 UT

The question of whether the trial

6

court properly resolved on the record the accuracy of contested
information m
Veteto,

sentencing reports is a question of law.

State

2000 UT 62, Hl3, 6 P.3d 1133 (citing State v. Kohl,

v.
2000

UT 35, 132, 999 P.2d 7 ) .
As a matter of compliance, Utah Cod<$ Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a),
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing."
State v. Jaeger,

1999 UT 1, ^44, 973 P.2d 404/ State

2004 UT App 206, ^26, 94 P.3d 295.

v.

Maroney,

The repord demonstrates that

the sentencing court failed to duly consider the inaccuracies set
forth

m

Kucharski,
Objection

the

Presentence

through
to

newly

Presentence

Report.
retained
Report

Prioi^ to
counsel,
(R.

sentencing,
filed

138-48).

an
Some

Mr.

10-page
of

the

objections appear to have been resolved but, contrary to counsel's
representation

at sentencing, not all of the objections were

resolved as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. g 77-18-1.
After recognizing that the objections had been filed, the
district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Kutharski without first

L

The State's Brief
ineffective assistance
failure to request that
report objections. As

of Appellee does not address Mr. Kucharski's
of counsel claim based on trial counsel's
the sentencing court Resolve the presentence
such, it is conceded.
7

complying with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), as conceded by the
State.

See

State

v.

Veteto,

2000 UT

62, fl4, 6 P.3d

1137

(sentencing judge's general statement concerning the inaccuracies
is insufficient).

The State, however, argues that the remand

"should be limited to those objections that allege inaccuracies in
the sentencing report."

See Brief of Appellee, p. 20.

This

request is not only without precedent and contrary to the statute,
but it is contrary to the plain language of the Objection to
Presentence Report filed by Mr. Kucharski, which explicitly states
that the basis for the objections is the "Presentence Report dated
February 16, 2007

. , . ."

(R. 138) .

Whether the objections

pertain to inaccuracies in the Presentence Investigation Report is
a matter to be addressed and resolved by the sentencing court, as
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) ,2

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Kucharski respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his

2

A further issue to be addressed and resolved by the sentencing
court is whether the Amended Presentence Investigation Report (R.
223), which was made part of the record on appeal pursuant to the
State's Motion to supplement the record, has been properly adopted
and presented by the State of Utah, Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P). This is unclear in light of the fact that it is not executed
by an authorized individual from AP&P.
8

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remarjid the case for further
proceedings consistent with this Court's (opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day^of September, 2009.
GGINS, P.C.

f€\

9

Wio^lns
forTSyppellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
the following on this 18th day of September, 2009:
Mr. Ryan D. Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT ^1^4-0854

Counsel for the

10

&La£e\of\jtah

ADDENDA
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a) (11) .
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